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TOOLS

Leveraging Grantmaking: Understanding
the Dynamics of Complex Social Systems
David Peter Stroh, M.CP.

Introduction

Key Points

In the summer of 2006, a group of local foundations supported the leaders of Calhoun County,
Michigan (population 100,000), to develop a 10year plan to end homelessness (Stroh & Goodman, 2007). The agreement forged by government officials at the municipal, state, and federal
levels — along with business leaders, service
providers, and homeless people themselves —
came after years of leadership inertia and conflict
among service providers regarding what needed
to be done to solve the problem instead of just
cope with it. Moreover, the plan signaled a paradigmatic shift in how the community viewed the
role of temporary shelters and other emergency
response services. Rather than be seen as part
of the solution to homelessness, these programs
came to be viewed as one of the key obstacles to
ending it.

· The nonobvious interrelationships among elements
in a complex system often thwart people’s best
intentions to sustainably improve system performance.

The plan won state funding, and a new executive director supported by a multi-sector board
began steering implementation. Service providers
who had previously worked independently and
competed for foundation and public monies came
together in new ways. One dramatic example was
that they all voted unanimously to reallocate HUD
funding from one service provider’s transitional
housing program to a permanent supportive
housing program run by another provider. Jennifer
Schrand, who chaired the planning process and is
currently Manager of Outreach and Development
for Legal Services of South Central Michigan, ob-
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· The complex, nonlinear problems that most foundations address can be solved most effectively
by thinking systemically instead of linearly about
these problems.
· Systems thinking offers a range of analytic tools to
improve our capacity to think systemically, including ways to distinguish problem symptoms from
root causes, reinforcing and balancing feedback,
system archetypes, mental models, and system
purpose and goals.
· Applying these tools enables us to target highleverage interventions that can lead to sustainable,
system-wide improvement.
· These tools can be applied using a five-step
implementation process.

served, “I learned the difference between changing
a particular system and leading systemic change.”
Why was this intervention so successful when
many other attempts by foundations to improve
the quality of people’s lives fall short? For example,
urban renewal programs of the 1960s were backed
by good intentions and significant funding, yet
they failed to produce the changes envisioned for
them. Moreover, the programs often made living
conditions worse — leading to such outcomes as
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abandoned public housing projects and increased
unemployment that resulted from apparently
successful job training programs (Forrester, 1969).
Stories of well-intentioned yet counterproductive
solutions continue to be numerous, as we learn
that temporary shelters can undermine community efforts to end homelessness, food aid can lead to
increased starvation, and drug busts can increase
drug-related crime. In other cases, short-term
successes are frequently not sustained and the
problem mysteriously reappears, as, for example,
when civic leaders invested in programs to reduce
urban youth crime or international donors funded
the drilling of wells in African villages to improve
access to potable water.

“When you are confronted by any
complex social system … with things
about it that you’re dissatisfied with
and anxious to fix, you cannot just
step in and set about fixing with
much hope of helping. This is one of
the sore discouragements of our time”
The planning project to end homelessness combined two significant interventions: a proactive
community development effort engaging leaders in
all sectors along with homeless people themselves,
and a systems diagnosis that enabled all stakeholders to agree on a shared picture of why homelessness persisted and where the leverage lay in ending
it. The purpose of this two-part article is to focus
on the less commonly used intervention: applying
systems thinking to help foundations make better
decisions about how to use their limited grantmaking resources for highest, sustainable impact. Part
1 addresses two key questions:
• Why are good intentions and obvious solutions
not enough to solve the chronic, complex problems many foundations seek to address?
• Where are the leverage points for improving
system performance in sustainable ways?
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Part 2 of the article will focus on how foundations
can increase the return on their social investments by aligning their grantmaking system with
the dynamics of the social systems they seek to
improve.

The Nonobvious Nature of Complex
Systems
Lewis Thomas, the award-winning medical essayist, observed, “When you are confronted by any
complex social system … with things about it that
you’re dissatisfied with and anxious to fix, you
cannot just step in and set about fixing with much
hope of helping. This is one of the sore discouragements of our time” (Thomas, 1979, p. 110).
The homelessness and other stories above all
epitomize this poignant insight. They share other
specific characteristics:
• The solutions that were implemented seemed
obvious at the time and in fact often helped
achieve the desired results in the short term. For
example, it is natural to provide shelter, even
temporary, for people who are homeless or offer food aid when people are starving.
• The longer-term impacts of the same solution tend to neutralize short-term gains or
even make things worse in the long term. For
example, the temporary shelters provided by
Calhoun County led to the ironic consequence
of reducing the visibility of its homeless population, which reduced community pressure to
solve the problem permanently.
• The negative consequences of these solutions
are unintentional; everyone is doing the best
they can with what they know at the time.
How can the interactions over time among elements in a complex system transform the best of
intentions into such disappointing results? The
reason lies in part because of our tendency to apply linear thinking to complex, nonlinear problems. Systems and linear thinking differ in several
important respects, as shown in Table 1 (see, for
example, Senge, 1990).
For example, a linear approach to starvation
might lead donors to assume that sending food
aid solves the problem. However, thinking about
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TABLE 1

Distinguishing Linear Thinking from Systems Thinking

Dimension

Linear thinking

Systems thinking

Causality

There is a direct connection
between problem symptoms
and their underlying causes.

System performance is largely determined by
interdependencies among system elements that are
indirect, circular, and nonobvious.

Time

A policy that achieves shortterm success ensures longterm success.

The unintended and delayed consequences of most
quick fixes neutralize or reverse immediate gains over
time.

Responsibility

Most problems are caused by
external factors beyond our
control.

Because actions taken by one group often have
delayed negative consequences on its own
performance as well as the behavior of others,
each group tends to unwittingly contribute to the
very problems it tries to solve and to undermine the
effectiveness of others.

Strategy

To improve the performance of
the whole, we must improve
the performance of its parts.

To improve the performance of the whole, we must
improve relationships among the parts.

Tackle many independent
initiatives simultaneously to
improve all the parts.

Identify a few key interdependencies that have the
greatest leverage on system-wide performance
(a.k.a. leverage points) and shift them in a sustained,
coordinated way over time.

it in a systemic way would raise concerns about
such unintended consequences of food aid as
depressed local food prices that deter local agricultural development and leave a country even
more vulnerable to food shortages in the future.
From a systemic view, temporary food aid only
exacerbates the problem in the long run unless it
is coupled with supports for local agriculture.
Because the problems addressed by foundations
are largely systemic, one step they can take to
increase the social return on their grantmaking
investments is to think systemically (vs. linearly).

The Basic Tools of Systems Thinking
There are several complementary approaches
to systems thinking, including general systems
theory (see, for example, Bertalanffy, 1968),
dynamic feedback (see, for example, Senge, 1990),
and complex adaptive systems (see, for example,
Zimmerman, Lindberg, & Plsek, 1998). This article focuses on dynamic feedback and introduces
such tools as
1. The iceberg — a tool for distinguishing problem symptoms from root causes
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2. Reinforcing and balancing feedback
3. Mental models — what people believe or assume to be true
4. System purpose and goals
5. Archetypes — recurring stories or patterns
that stimulate insight into more complex
dynamics.
They are not difficult to learn and may shape a
more impactful grantmaking process.
Tool 1: The Iceberg
Linear thinking tends to mask the nonobvious
relationships between problem symptoms and
causes that complex systems exhibit. The iceberg
is a simple tool for distinguishing symptoms
from causes. As shown in Figure 1, it distinguishes three levels of insight — each of which
is informed by a specific question and prompts a
certain type of action or response.
We often focus our attention on responding to
individual events. We want to know what is happening and react quickly to the crisis at hand. For
example, the untimely death of a homeless person
or appearance of people asking for money or food
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FIGURE 1 The Iceberg

in a downtown area might temporarily increase
community pressure to solve the homelessness
problem. Alternatively, natural disasters such
as Hurricane Katrina, the Indonesian tsunami,
or a major drought call for rapid deployment of
resources to save lives and property. Yet as we see
in the food aid example, how we respond to a crisis
can have an enormous impact on the long-term
health of the people we help. These impacts are not
necessarily obvious unless we think them through.
Sometimes we step back from individual events
long enough to recognize ongoing trends or patterns. We ask what has been happening over time
and try to anticipate the future based on the past.
Trends can often be surprising and disturbing.
For example, efforts to reduce homelessness in
Calhoun County had leveled off despite the fact
that the estimated number of homeless people
continued to increase. Moreover, visibility of the
problem as measured by civic and media attention had declined over many years even though
the problem continued to worsen. This disturbing
pattern is summarized in Figure 2.
In the face of such patterns, we want to know why
the problem persists and permanently change the
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trends to ensure a significant and lasting decline
in homelessness. The root causes of a chronic,
complex problem can be found in its underlying
System Structure — the many circular, interdependent, and sometimes time-delayed relationships among its parts. The structure includes both
easily observable components — such as current
pressures, policies, and power dynamics — and
less obvious factors such as perceptions and
purposes (goals or intentions) that influence how
these components affect behavior.
In the homelessness example, people’s perceptions (mental models, mind-sets, beliefs, and
assumptions) included the following:
• Many people are homeless because they want
to be.
• We are working as hard as we can to help
people who are homeless.
• Funds must be directed toward the most visible
problems.
The actual intention of the shelter and emergency
services system was to temporarily reduce the
problem’s visibility and severity without addressing the underlying causes of socioeconomic pres-
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FIGURE 2 Trends in Addressing Homelessness

sure coupled with personal vulnerability that gave
rise to the problem. The system was not designed
to end homelessness despite the espoused efforts
of many to do so.
Hence, a second leverage point for foundations
is to use the iceberg to dig below more obvious
events and trends in order to clarify the system
structures at the root cause of complex, chronic
problems.
Tool 2: Reinforcing and Balancing Feedback
Reinforcing and balancing feedback are the two
basic circular structures that describe how systems evolve over time. More complex dynamics
result from combinations of these two feedback
structures.
Reinforcing feedback is the basis for what we
know as virtuous and vicious cycles. It explains
the development of both engines of growth (a.k.a.
flywheels) as well as spiraling deterioration. For
example, Jim Collins has applied the flywheel
concept he introduced in his book Good to Great
(Collins, 2001) to suggesting how social sector
organizations can develop their own engines of
success (Collins, 2005, pp. 23–28). He believes
that success in the social sector hinges on the
ability to grow organizations (not just programs)
by building a brand that attracts support that
yields demonstrable results and in turn strengthens the brand. Collins also points out that the
same reinforcing dynamic can produce the
opposite effect, as when an organization that
performs poorly weakens its brand reputation,
which makes it more difficult to attract resources
and drives results down even further. Several
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overlapping vicious cycles in the homelessness
case explain how the number of people at risk of
becoming homeless tended to increase over time,
and how homelessness could coexist with vacant
housing (see Figure 3).
Most people are accustomed to thinking of
growth as a linear process. However, reinforcing
feedback describes a more common process in
social and economic systems — that of exponential growth where a quantity increases by a
constant percentage of the whole in a constant
time period. Such phenomena as increases in
savings and population are familiar illustrations
of exponential processes. Foundations seeking a
long-term return on their grantmaking investments benefit from cultivating critical mass or
tipping points that build sustainable momentum
in a social system (Ball, 2006; Gladwell, 2000).
The following French riddle points out several
important implications of exponential growth
(Meadows, Meadows, Randers, & Behrens,
1972). Imagine a lily pond where the lily plant
doubles in size every day, and the pond is totally
covered by the lily in 30 days. When is the pond
half-covered? The answer, which is surprising for
many people, is 29 days; that is, half of the pond is
covered just one day before the pond is completely blanketed by the lily. How much of the pond is
covered in 15 days? The answer here is 0.0025%;
that is, half-way into the month the lily is barely
noticeable.
The exponential nature of organic growth has
several consequences for foundation decision
making. First, most people tend to expect to see
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FIGURE 3 Deterioration of Affordable Housing

improvements faster than they are capable of
developing. Expecting the system to shift quickly
can lead to unrealistic demands for growth that
ultimately slow improvement down if not kill it
entirely. Alternatively, people can miss or misinterpret small improvements and give up prematurely on supporting a change that takes time to
manifest. Figure 4 depicts the exponential nature
of organic reinforcing growth and contrasts it
with the more typical linear assumption people
hold about how things should grow.
Second, a success engine or flywheel is built not
only on the individual factors that contribute to
growth, but also on how these factors interact
to reinforce each other over time. For example,
successful micro-lending programs integrate
community involvement, peer support, financial investment, economic results, job creation,
and community reinvestment in ever-expanding
spirals. An implication for foundation managers
might be that they evaluate grantee plans based on
the clarity and soundness of their structural design
— how the parts fit together — rather than on the
individual elements themselves. It can be helpful
to notice that one approach to increasing the effectiveness of a theory of change is to explain how
parts of the system are intended to interact in both
direct and indirect ways over time.
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Third, because exponential growth also applies
to seemingly trivial problems getting much
worse over time, it is important to monitor such
problems early on and consider addressing them
rapidly instead of hoping they go away. For example, the “broken windows theory” suggests that
community instability is catalyzed by disorderly
conditions (Kelling and Wilson, 1982). The theory
is based on research showing that a car in good
condition in a poor neighborhood would be vandalized only after one window had been broken.
It has led police departments around the country
to control minor misbehaviors and maintain a
clean environment to prevent major crimes from
occurring (Johnson, 2009).
Hence, a third leverage point for foundations is
to cultivate engines of growth slowly and break
potential vicious cycles quickly.
Balancing feedback is the second foundational
structure in complex systems. It is the core
dynamic of problem-solving or goal-seeking
behavior. We recognize it in our daily experience, for example, when we balance our needs for
activity and replenishment by eating when we get
hungry or sleeping to refresh ourselves. In contrast to reinforcing feedback loops that amplify
an existing condition, balancing feedback seeks
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FIGURE 4 Lessons From the Lily Pond

to correct or reverse a current state to bridge the
gap between actual and desired performance. For
example, a foundation might fund a mentoring
program between older and younger students to
improve graduation rates or a counseling program to reduce teen pregnancy. When balancing
feedback accomplishes a desired goal, the corrective process often becomes invisible. When we eat
enough food or get enough sleep, we tend to take
these functions for granted. Alternatively, foundations might terminate funding for a program that
appears successful and divert funds to meet a
more pressing need.
By contrast, we are more aware of balancing
processes when a system is not accomplishing
the goal we state for it. In other words, balancing feedback also helps explain why systems
do not change despite people’s best efforts to
improve them. Simple corrective processes fail
to function as intended in at least one of three
ways.
First, we often stop investing in the solution once
a problem appears solved. This act of “taking the
pressure off ” often leads the problem to recur —
much to the frustration of the problem solvers.
For example, urban youth crime in Boston was a
serious problem in the early 1990s. Political and
community leaders banded together to develop
numerous coordinated solutions in response, for
instance, community policing, neighborhood
watches, gang outreach, and after-school programs. When youth crime declined as a result,
political leaders felt obligated to shift funds to
more obviously pressing problems. As a result,
they gradually began to cut back on the crime
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prevention programs that worked so well, and the
problem returned (Fox, 2003).
The second tendency is to fail to appreciate the
time required to effect change. For example, a
recent success story on curbing teen drinking and
substance abuse in one Massachusetts community of 46,000 where adults also exhibited above
average rates of alcohol and drug abuse described
how coordinated improvements had gradually
taken hold over a period of 11 years (Moscowitz,
2008). Such patience and persistence is rare. Normal reactions in the face of time delay are either
to become impatient and push for premature
results or to give up too quickly.
The third way in which balancing loops can fail
to correct an existing situation is when there is
lack of agreement on the goals of the system, the
current level of performance and what drives it,
or both. For example, a report sponsored by the
Ball Foundation noted there is no lack of educational innovation in selected U.S. schools and
school districts (Institute on Education and the
Economy, 1995). However, educators seeking
to disseminate these innovations on a broader
scale were confronted by serious disagreements
about both the goals of K–12 education and current performance levels.1 Some school districts
defined their goals in terms of test scores, while
others viewed graduation, subsequent employment, or the motivation and capacity for continuous learning as the desired result. Similarly, these
school districts measured actual performance
1
The author wishes to thank Jennifer Kemeny and Sherry
Immediato for this insight based on their work in the
project.

115

Stroh

differently in terms of test scores, how children
performed after graduation, and indicators of
creativity and self-directed learning. It is very difficult to define and disseminate a particular strategy when the desired future, system goals, and/or
perceptions of current conditions are ambiguous
or conflicted. By contrast, anchoring the system
in a common picture of the desired state (for
example, through shared visioning) and a common understanding of current reality and why it
persists (for example, through systems thinking)
builds creative tension that aligns and propels the
efforts of multiple stakeholders (Senge, 1990).
These insights about balancing loops point to
three additional leverage points that foundations
might focus on:
• In order to reduce the risk of taking the pressure off, ensure that effective solutions are
reinforced and can be sustained over time.
• Respect time delays: be patient and persistent
in your grantmaking.
• Establish a clear and compelling shared vision,
joint goals, and a common understanding of
current reality before developing strategy.

The influence of mental models
can direct foundations to another
leverage point: clarify and shift
mental models that influence the
way the system operates.
Tool 3: Mental Models
Mental models encompass what people believe
or assume to be true. They are often described as
paradigms, mind-sets, beliefs, assumptions, cultural narratives, norms, expectations, or simply
perceptions. Mental models significantly impact
how people behave and perform. For example,
the “shelter mentality” in Calhoun County turned
out to be such a significant factor in perpetuating homelessness that the 10-year plan to end
homelessness identified shifting people’s mind-
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set to valuing a comprehensive array of support,
housing, and employment services as one of
their top goals. Other critical mental models that
needed to be addressed included “Many people
are homeless because they want to be” and
“Funds must be directed towards the most visible
problems.”
While mental models are necessary to help us
simplify the world, they are inherently limited
and can often become outmoded as conditions
change. To ensure that current mental models are
still relevant and useful, foundation staff might do
the following:
• Surface current beliefs held by system stakeholders, including people in the foundation.
• Test the utility rather than validity of these
beliefs, that is, determine if the beliefs help
people achieve the results they really want
instead of whether or not they are true.
• Encourage stakeholders to expand their views
by supporting them to learn from each other.
• Point out disconfirming data that challenges
the validity of current beliefs.
• Consider how existing data might be interpreted differently, for example, by accounting for
time delays or the tendency to take the pressure
off of a “solved” problem.
• Help people clarify the future they want to create and define new beliefs or assumptions that
support them to achieve it.
• Establish experiment(s) that people can run to
test the viability of these new beliefs and assumptions.
The influence of mental models can direct foundations to another leverage point: clarify and shift
mental models that influence the way the system
operates.
Tool 4: Purpose
A foundational principle in systems thinking is that
a system is exquisitely designed to achieve its current purpose. This principle has two implications:
• It is important to understand the payoffs of
the status quo no matter how dysfunctional it
appears to be
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• System goals are more effective when they target desired results instead of expected effort.
First, a core reason that systems resist change
is that the purpose achieved by the current system — as defined by its vision, mission, values,
goals, and/or metrics — is more compelling
than its espoused purpose. For example, community leaders in Calhoun County pursued goals
of reducing the visibility of homelessness and
temporarily easing people’s pain through shelters
even though they espoused a goal of permanently
ending homelessness. Any one stakeholder in a
system can undermine its own ability to achieve
espoused goals because it holds competing goals
without recognizing the discrepancy (Kegan &
Lahey, 2001). Conflicting goals can also be held
by different stakeholders in the system — as
when Israeli settlers and Islamist extremists hold
goals of one unified religious state west of the
Jordan River while the majority of the populations on both sides favor a two-state solution
(Stroh, 2002 ).
In order for people to reconcile what they say
they want the system to accomplish with what
it actually is accomplishing, people have two
basic choices. The ideal solution is to realize both
purposes simultaneously. For example, it is possible to design homeless shelter services in a way
that simultaneously supports people to achieve
permanent housing. However, the both/and solution is often not feasible either because focusing
on short-term goals frequently undermines the
system’s ability to achieve long-term goals or
because certain goals are inherently incompatible. The alternative under these circumstances is
to consciously choose one of the two intentions
and primarily focus on this result. In the case of
Calhoun County, community leaders consciously
chose creating permanent, safe, affordable, and
supportive housing rather than coping with
homelessness as their purpose going forward.
Second, because it is often easier to measure
effort than results, people tend to create systems
that utilize a lot of resources for questionable
outcomes. Well-known systems theorist Donella
Meadows explains:
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If the desired system state is good education, measuring that goal by the amount of money spent per
student will ensure money spent per student. If the
quality of education is measure by performance on
standardized tests, the system will produce performance on standardized tests. Whether either of these
measures is correlated with good education is at least
worth thinking about. (Meadows, 2008, p. 138)

The implication for foundations is
to distinguish and reconcile desired
results with current outcomes and
metrics.
In the case of Calhoun County, measuring prevention of homelessness is more difficult than
measuring either temporary care or resettlement
in permanent housing. However, it has been
estimated that one dollar spent on prevention is
worth six dollars required to house people who
have become homeless. Success in reducing the
risk of homelessness might be difficult to evaluate, but risk reduction is very effective.
The implication for foundations is to distinguish
and reconcile desired results with current outcomes and metrics.
Tool 5: System Archetypes
Most complex problems arise from combinations
of many reinforcing and/or balancing feedback
processes. The good news is that we can gain
preliminary insight into a wide range of dynamics by learning a dozen or so system archetypes
or classic stories. The archetypes are recurring
patterns that appear in many different situations.
They are well-understood, easily transferable
across different system contexts, and often serve
as catalysts for discerning even more complex
dynamics (Kim, 1993).
One of the most common archetypes is the story
of Shifting the Burden (to the Quick Fix). This is
the basic archetype of unintended dependency
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or addiction. The dynamic describes a situation where people are aware of a long-term,
fundamental solution to a problem symptom.
However, they choose to implement a quick fix
instead because it is easier to do so and in fact
temporarily relieves the problem symptom.
Over time, continuous dependence on the quick
fix makes it increasingly difficult to implement
the long-term solution even if people wanted
to. As a result the problem symptom gradually
gets worse. Addiction to shelters and emergency
services constituted a core dynamic in perpetuating homelessness in Calhoun County (see detail
in the next section). Other examples include
countries that become addicted to food aid while
undermining the more fundamental response of
local agriculture development, African villages
that became dependent on the government to
fix wells the government had installed, and our
nation’s dependence on prisons instead of community socioeconomic development to reduce
urban crime.

The implication for foundations is
to look for archetypal patterns of
behavior that begin to explain why
a complex problem persists.
Other common archetypes include Fixes That
Backfire — the story of unintended consequences,
Limits to Growth — the story of unanticipated
constraints, Tragedy of the Commons — the story
of optimizing the parts in a way that destroys the
whole, and Accidental Adversaries — the story of
partners who become enemies. An example of a
Fix That Backfires occurs when drug busts take
criminals off the street and thus reduce drugrelated crime in the short run, but also remove
drugs from circulation, thereby increasing drug
prices and requiring addicts to steal more to pay
for the reduced supply in the long run (Friedman, 1976). Foundations often face the challenge
of Limits to Growth when they find it difficult to
help their grantees scale up a successful ex-
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perimental program. Tragedy of the Commons
manifests in the overgrazing of such shared
environmental resources as fisheries, water, and
air. Nonprofit, public, and private sector organizations that seek to benefit from collaborating to
solve a shared problem risk becoming Accidental
Adversaries when they focus on the blind spots
and shortcomings of their respective partners
instead of building on each others’ strengths.
The implication for foundations is to look for archetypal patterns of behavior that begin to explain
why a complex problem persists.

Applying the Systems Approach
Implementing the systems approach involves:
1. Building a strong foundation for change by
engaging multiple stakeholders to identify an
initial vision and picture of current reality
2. Engaging stakeholders to explain their often
competing views of why a chronic, complex
problem persists despite people’s best efforts
to solve it
3. Integrating the diverse perspectives into a
map that provides a multipartial and more
complete picture of the system and root
causes of the problem
4. Supporting people to see how their wellintended efforts to solve the problem often
make the problem worse
5. Affirming a compelling vision of the future
and supportive strategies that can lead to
sustainable, system-wide change.
For example, in the homelessness case, the local
Homeless Coalition had been meeting for many
years to end homelessness. Their shared desire
to serve the homeless had been undermined by
disagreements about alternative solutions, competition for limited funds, and limited knowledge
about best practices. Although many understood
the importance of a collective effort to provide
critical services, housing, and jobs to both homeless people and those at risk of losing their homes,
they were unable to generate the collective will
and capacity to implement such an approach. They
lacked a shared vision of the future they wanted
to create, an understanding of current reality,
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FIGURE 5 Shifting the Burden to Temporary Shelters

and a common appreciation of how they were all
contributing to that reality. Finally, the promise of
state funding if they could agree on a 10-year plan
to end homelessness, the provision of funding for
developing the plan by local donors, and the use of
a team of consultants experienced in community
development, systems thinking, and national best
housing practices enabled them to break through
years of frustrated attempts.

ers, we analyzed a number of interdependent
factors that led people to become homeless in
the first place, get off the street temporarily, and
find it so difficult to secure safe, supportive, and
affordable permanent housing.

We learned that the most ironic obstacle to
implementing the fundamental solution was the
community’s very success in providing temporary
shelters and supports. These shelters and supports
had led to several unintended consequences. One
The Coalition with the help of consultants enwas that they reduced the visibility of the problem
listed and organized the support of community
to the community overall. The low visibility was
leaders across the nonprofit, public, and private
sectors along with themselves and representatives compounded by the facts that (1) many people
from the homeless population. They established a were naturally reluctant to see the problem in the
set of committees and task forces as well as a clear first place, (2) people who were homeless were
also fearful of being seen and hid their condiand detailed planning process. While they began
tion as best they could, and (3) there was a lack
by articulating a shared vision of ending homeof accurate data about the extent of the problem.
lessness, they would not be able to really commit
The overall lack of visibility reduced community
to this result until they fully understood the syspressure to solve the problem and create a differtem dynamics that perpetuated the problem. My
ent future.
colleague Michael Goodman and I were brought
in specifically to apply systems thinking to (1)
The temporary success of shelters and other prounderstand the dynamics of local homelessness,
visional supports also tended to reinforce funding
(2) determine why the problem persisted despite
to individual organizations for their current work.
people’s best efforts to solve it, and (3) identify
high-leverage interventions that could shift these Donors played a role in buttressing existing funding patterns through their pressure to demondynamics and serve as the basis for a 10-year
strate short-term success. Such reinforcement
plan. Through interviews with all key stakehold-
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TABLE 2

Leverage Points

1.

Think systemically (vs. linearly) to be strategic

2.

Dig below obvious events and trends to clarify system structures at the root cause of complex,
chronic problems

3.

Cultivate engines of growth slowly and break vicious cycles quickly

4.

Ensure that effective solutions are reinforced and can be sustained over time

5.

Respect time delays: be patient and persistent

6.

Establish a clear and compelling shared vision, joint goals, and a common understanding of current
reality before developing strategy

7.

Clarify and shift mental models that influence the way the system currently operates

8.

Distinguish and reconcile desired results with current outcomes and metrics

9.

Look for archetypal patterns of behavior that begin to explain why a complex problem persists

10.

Reduce dependence on quick fixes and develop shared vision in support of a fundamental solution

11.

Incorporate movement toward the fundamental solution into quick fixes that cannot be avoided

decreased the service providers’ willingness, time,
and funding to innovate and collaborate. This in
turn led to
•
•
•
•

Fragmentation of services
Competition for existing funds
Lack of deeper knowledge of best practices
Reluctance to overcome government restrictions that made it difficult to innovate
• A shelter mentality.

3. To the extent that people must rely in part
on the quick fix, seek to apply it in a way that
makes it easier (not harder) to implement the
fundamental solution.
For example, in the homelessness case, we helped
the county define goals based on these interventions that formed the basis for a 10-year plan
subsequently approved by the state:

Because archetypal dynamics are recurring and
we understand what causes them, we also know a
lot about the leverage points that help shift them.
There are three proven interventions to transform
the Shifting the Burden archetype:

• Challenge the shelter mentality and end funding for more shelters
• Develop a community vision where all citizens
have permanent, safe, affordable, and supportive housing
• Align the strategies and resources of all stakeholders including funders in service of this
vision
• Redesign shelter and provisional support
programs to provide more effective bridges to
critical services, housing, and employment.

1. Reduce dependence on the quick fix, often by
exploring the mental models that influence
their use
2. Build shared vision among key stakeholders
that motivates people to implement the more
fundamental solution

Two years later the county continues to make
progress toward these goals. The program has
an executive director, in-kind funding for space
and supplies, additional funding focused on
long-term strategies, and a community-wide
board supported by eight committees underway

The community’s collective ability to implement
the fundamental solution was undermined as a
result. The essence of these dynamics is described
in Figure 5.
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with clear charters producing monthly reports
on their goals. A community-wide eviction prevention policy was changed to enable people to
stay in their homes longer, and a street outreach
program is going well to place people into housing.
The implications of the Shifting the Burden
dynamic for foundations committed to funding
fundamental solutions are to reduce dependence
on quick fixes, develop shared vision in support of
the fundamental solution, and incorporate movement toward the fundamental solution into quick
fixes that cannot be eliminated.
A summary of all 11 leverage points appears in
Table 2.

The implications of the Shifting the
Burden dynamic for foundations
committed to funding fundamental
solutions are to reduce dependence
on quick fixes, develop shared vision
in support of the fundamental
solution, and incorporate
movement toward the fundamental
solution into quick fixes that cannot
be eliminated.

Summary and Conclusions
Good intentions are not sufficient to produce
positive outcomes. This is especially important
because nonobvious system dynamics often
seduce us into doing what is expedient but ultimately ineffective.
At the heart of systems thinking is the ability to
trace a problem from how it often manifests in
the form of a specific event or a disturbing trend
to determining and addressing its underlying root
causes. This involves defining the various components of systems structure: formal elements
such as pressures, policies, and power dynamics as well as more informal yet often governing
aspects such as perceptions (or mental models)
and purpose (or goals). It is especially useful to
clarify how these components interact. The analytic tools of reinforcing and balancing feedback
as well as frequently recurring system archetypes
provide catalysts for understanding the often
nonobvious interdependencies that shape system
performance over time.
System behavior changes as a result of making a
few, key coordinated changes over time. Based
on this introduction to how dynamic systems
function, the article has identified a five-step
change process and 11 leverage points for
achieving sustainable, system-wide improvement.

2009 Vol 1:3

Despite the many benefits of this approach, it
is also important to recognize the challenges
foundations might face in implementing it. Systems thinking urges us to expand our horizons
of time — approaching what we do in the short
term within a clear long-term context — and
space — engaging many diverse stakeholders as
partners in a continuous learning process. Part
2 of this article will help foundations meet these
challenges by suggesting ways in which they can
align their programming approaches and systems
with the dynamics of how complex social systems
behave and evolve.
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